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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
-vs- t 
RAYMOND JEFFREY JOHNSON, : Case No. 20562 
Defendant/Appellant, : 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment and commitment 
issued by the Third Judicial District Court, County of Salt 
Lake, State of Utah, the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was charged in the Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, with aggravated robbery, a first degree 
felony in violation of Title 76, Chapter 2, Section 202, 
Title 76, Chapter 3, Section 203 (1)(4), and Title 76, 
Chapter 6, Section 302, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as 
amended), and with aggravated assault, a third degree felony 
in violation of Title 76, Chapter 2, Section 202, Title 76, 
Chapter 3, Section 203 (3)(4), and Title 76, Chapter 5, 
Section 103, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) and with 
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theft a second degree felony, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 2, Section 202, Title 76, Chapter 3, Section 203 
(2) (4) and Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 412 and Title 76, 
Chapter 6, Section 404, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as 
amended). Following a jury trial which commenced on January 
16, 1985, appellant was sentenced to a term in the Utah 
State Prison of not less than five (5) but which may be for 
his life, on the aggravated robbery, not more than five (5) 
years in the Utah state prison on the aggravated assault and 
not less than one (1) or more than fifteen (15) years on the 
theft conviction. In addition the defendant was given an 
additional one (1) year in the Utah State Prison to run 
consecutively with the previous terms as an enhancement for 
the use of a firearm. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of his conviction and the 
order of the court requiring a new trial on the matter. In 
addition, appellant seeks suppression of certain evidence 
which was introduced at trial, and the order of the court 
prohibiting its introduction at any subsequent trial. In 
addition, appellant seeks reversal of his conviction for 
aggravated assault and theft and this courts order 
dismissing the same. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. That the district court erred in not suppressing 
the evidence seized in California because there was no 
probable cause to enter and search. The search went beyond 
constitutional limits of an inventory in opening the hood 
and the locket trunk of the automobile and certain 
containers found in the trunk. 
2. That there was insufficient evidence to convict 
appellant of the aggravated assault because there was no 
evidence appellant displayed a weapon, directly committing 
the offense or aided by requesting or commanding such 
assault to be committed. 
3. That the court erred in instructing the jury 
regarding certain inferences to be drawn from the fact that 
defendant was found in possession of recently stolen 
property as a violation of due process of law. 
4. That the court erred in not dismissing the 
charge of theft as a lesser included offense of robbery 
under the facts of this case. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the 18th day of August, 1984, a man identified as 
Paul Anthony Branch entered Oakwood Jewelry, located at 2342 
East 70th South in Salt Lake County. He confronted JoAnn 
-3-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Knapus, a sales person at the business, forcing her into a 
back room. (T. Vol. 4 Pg. 9-13) A second person entered the 
establishment and was behind a sales counter when Stella 
Kyarsguard, a sales person connected with another business 
located at the approximate location of Oakwood Jewelry, 
entered the business establishment. (T. Vol. 7 Pg. 30-37) 
Mrs. Kyarsguard identified this other person, on alternate 
occasions, either as Paul Anthony Branch or Allan David 
Johnson. She was confronted by this second man who 
displayed a firearm forcing her into the same back room 
where Mrs. Knapus was located. 
When the two ladies were released from the back room 
they observed that all of the jewelry, previously located in 
various display cabinets and cases had been taken. (T. Vol. 
4 Pg. 19) 
Marsha Wright and her daughter Misty were sitting in 
their automobile in the parking lot outside of Oakwood 
Jewelry when they observed two men with a large garbage bag 
hurrying around the corner and entering a yellowish-tannish 
automobile they later identified had 4 doors and was a 
Pontiac. The two ladies described the men as wearing army 
type fatigues with caps and full beards. The automobile 
they entered had two passengers, a man driving and a woman 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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with long black hair in the front passenger seat. All these 
witnesses identified appellant at trial. They were unable 
to make an identification when shown appellant's picture by 
police on prior occasions. (T. Vol. 6 Pg. 110-122; 129; 
160-177) 
On August 24, 1984, at the Pink Motel in Los Angeles 
California, two officers, with the Los Angeles Police 
Department assigned to a burglary detail, were on routine 
patrol investigating burglary suspects. (T. Vol. 2 Pg. 
3-11; Vol 4 Pg. 89-96) They observed, in the parking lot of 
the Pink Motel, appellant, Raymond Jeffrey Johnson, behind 
the wheel of a tannish Chevrolet operating hydraulic lifts. 
Having positioned themselves in the parking lot of the 
motel, they observed, through the open door of apartment 10, 
two people standing and apparently administering drugs 
intravenously. The officers repositioned themselves and 
observed a person later identified as Gina Salazar enter the 
automobile which appellant Johnson had started. The 
automobile began to exit the parking lot when the officers 
observed two other people, later identified as Allan David 
Johnson and Teresa Alverez, approaching the automoble. The 
officers stopped the suspects, observing marijuana inside 
the automobile and track marks on the inside of the suspects 
-5-
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arms. The officers placed the suspects under arrest for 
using controlled substances and commenced a search of both 
the automobile and apartment 10 of the motel. (T. Vol. 2 
Pg. 12-16; Vol. 4 Pg. 103-111) 
The officers, in their search, seized items of drug 
paraphernalia in the motel room and a hand held .38 caliber 
revolver, in addition to various items of jewelry. They 
also seized jewelry located in purses and upon the persons 
of various suspects. 
The officers then determined to do an inventory 
search of the automobile following their declared purpose of 
impounding the same, pursuant to the arrest of the suspects 
for using controlled substances. During the course of the 
search an officer raised the hood of the Chevrolet and 
observed a towel secured with cords near the engine. The 
officer seized the bundle. Inside the bundle were found 
various items of jewelry. The officers also opened the 
trunk of the automobile and observed a small five (5) inch 
by two (2) inch box with the name Oakwood Jewelry. The 
officers seized the box, opened the same, and found small 
bindles containing precious gems inside. (T. Vol. 2 Pg. 
16-18; Vol. 4 Pg. 109-112) 
The authorities in Salt Lake City were contacted, 
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because of the address on the Oakwood Jewelry box and it was 
later determined by the Los Angeles police that the jewelry 
they had seized had been stolen. Appellant was extradited 
to Utah and charged with the aggravated robbery of JoAnn 
Knapus, the aggravated assault of Stella Kyarsguard and the 
theft from Oakwood Jewelry. 
A Motion to Suppress evidence seized from the 
automibile, the motel and person of appellant was filed, 
argued and denied and said evidence was subsequently 
introduced at trial. (Record Pg. 53; T. Vol. 1 and Vol. 2) 
At trial, neither Mrs. Knapus nor Mrs. Kyarsguard 
identified appellant as one of the perpetrators of the 
offense. However, other witnesses, including Marsha and 
Misty Wright, located outside the business testified that 
they had observed appellant walking about the business. 
Although each of these witnesses identified appellant 
Johnson, they were inconsistent in terms of what clothing 
was being worn and the physical description including length 
of facial hair. 
The automobile seized in California was identified 
as being owned by appellant and later identified by Marsha 
and Misty Wright as the same automobile they observed in the 
parking lot of Oakwood Jewelry. 
-7-
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Appellant presented an alibi defense at trial in 
that# at the time of the offense, he was with a man known as 
Ceasar Boswell riding motorcycles and helping to prepare a 
picnic area for a rally. 
The court instructed the jury that the law of the 
State of Utah allowed them to infer, when a person is in 
possession of recently stolen property and fails to make a 
satisfactory explanation of such possession, that the person 
in possession stole such property. (Record Pg. 188) 
Appellant was convicted of all three offenses and 
was sentenced to the Utah State Prison. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I of this Brief will argue that appellant was 
deprived of his rights under the 4th and 14th Amendment to 
the United States Constitution in that the Los Angeles 
police improperly seized evidence from the person and 
automobile of appellant because they had no probable cause 
to believe that there was contraband which existed; and 
further that the police went beyond permissible limits in 
conducting an inventory search of the automobile when they 
opened the hood and the small box contained in the trunk. 
The court erred in not suppressing that evidence and 
permitting its introduction at trial. 
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Point II of appellant's Brief will argue that there 
was insufficient evidence to convict appellant of the 
aggravated assault of Stella Kyarsguard because he was not 
identified as the perpetrator of that particular offense nor 
was there any evidence presented at trial to indicate that 
he aided, requested, assisted, or commanded that crime be 
committed. The court erred in not granting appellant's 
motion for a directed verdict of acquittal or in the 
alternative an order of dismissal. 
Point III of this Brief will argue that appellant 
was denied due prossess of law when the court, improperly 
instructed the jury that under the law of the State of Utah, 
possession of property recently stolen, when a person in 
possession fails to make a satisfactory explanation of such 
possession, is a fact from which they may infer that the 
person in possession stole such property. Such an 
instruction shifts the burden of proof to the ultimate issue 
from the prosecutor to the defendant. 
Point IV will argue that defendant was improperly 
convicted of both aggravated robbery and theft because, 
under the circumstances of this case theft was a lesser 
included offense of robbery and Title 76, Chapter 1, Section 
402 (3) Utah Code Annotated, (1953 as amended) prohibits 
such a dual conviction. 
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POINT I 
SEARCH OF APPELLANTS AUTOMOBILE, WITHOUT A 
WARRANT, WAS NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMITTED 
AS BEYOND THE SCOPE OP AN INVENTORY SEARCH 
The two Los Angeles police officers were on routine 
patrol having been assigned to a burglary detail. They had 
gone by the Pink Motel in Los Angeles, California as a 
routine gesture, knowing that this site was a common area 
for persons engaged in drug trafficking. Their experience 
had been that stolen property was commonly connected with 
such drug trafficking. The officers had positioned 
themselves in the parking lot of the motel in such a way as 
to gain the best view of all activity going on. 
When they observed appellant operating his 
automobile with hydraulic lifts, which are illegal in , 
California, they determined to stop him with a view to their 
continuing search for stolen merchandise. When they had 
seen other persons using drugs and smelled marijuana and , 
observed track marks on the arms of appellant they arrested 
him for drug related offenses connected therewith. 
Although the automobile could have remained in the . 
parking lot of the motel, they determined to impound the 
same and inventory its contents. 
t 
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The issue in this context is the constitutional 
scope of an inventory search. 
In U.S. v Bloomfield, 594 F.2nd 1200, (8th Cir. 
1979), the court examined a situation in which an automobile 
was impounded for blocking traffic and a knapsack, which was 
tied, was opened for the express purposes of examing its 
contents. The court, in this case, outlined the three 
legitimate reasons the police might be permitted, without a 
warrant, to inventory an impounded vehicle. First, to 
protect the owners property while in the custody of the 
police. Secondly, protection of police against claims. 
Thirdly, protection against damage. 
In United States v Hellman, 556 F.2nd 442, (9th Cir. 
1977), where, from the facts of the case it became apparent 
that an inventory was conducted as an investigatory 
procedure rather than for legitimate reasons as outlined in 
the Bloomfield decision, the court determined that the 
search was really a pretext looking for incriminating 
evidence. 
A series of decisions from the United States Supreme 
Court lends greater insight to the parameters of an 
inventory search. 
-11-
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In South Dakota v Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, (1976) a 
car was impounded for parking violations and inventoried. 
Marijuana was found in a glove compartment. The Supreme 
Court determined that such a search was not unreasonable as 
a routine caretaking procedure. 
"The inventory was not unreasonable in 
scope. Respondent's motion to supress in 
state court challenged the inventory only 
as to items inside the car not in plain 
view. But once the policeman was 
lawfully inside the car to secure the 
personal property in plain view, it was 
not unreasonable to open the unlocked 
glove compartment to which vandals would 
have had ready and unobstructed access 
once inside the car". supra, Footnote 10 
Pg. 376. 
In Arkansas v Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), the 
Supreme Court determined that the search of a suitcase 
located in the trunk of a car lawfully stopped was 
inpermissable. In U.S. v Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), the 
search of a double locked foot locker was unreasonable 
without a warrant. 
The thread that runs through these decisions is 
whether the police were engaged in a proper inventory 
procedure, having lawfully stopped and impounded an 
automobile. The search is for true inventory purpose when 
the prime motive was the securing of property for the 
•12-
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reasons set forth in the Bloomfield decision. Where the 
police have engaged in an inventory procedure as a general 
investigatory search it is necessary that a warrant be 
secured. 
In State v Crabtree, 618 P.2nd 484 (Utah 1980), this 
court examined the inventory issue in the context of a case 
where a person had been arrested for being a fugitive and 
his suitcase was opened after he had informed police that 
there was money and a firearm located therein. Because of a 
legitimate need to secure the property, which the defendant 
in that case told the police existed within that suitcase, 
and as protection, the police were permitted to open the 
suitcase and examine its contents* 
In this case it is clear that the inventory search 
engaged in by the police was investigatory in nature. 
First, the officers involved had little concern with the 
fact that defendant had and was using hydraulic lifts on his 
automobile. Their detail was burglary and they were at the 
motel looking for stolen merchandise. 
Secondly, even after appellant was arrested for the 
use of drugs, the police made no investigation as to whether 
he was staying at the motel and if so whether the automobile 
could remain there while they processed his arrest. 
-13-
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Thirdly, the search of a locked trunk was 
unnecessary because of the fact that the trunk was locked 
and there was no indication that anything of value was 
claimed by appellant to be located therein. It is 
interesting to note that appellant was never asked in 
connection with the inventory whether anything existed of 
value in the automobile. 
Fourth, looking under the hood of the automobile, 
although a typical police practice, was unjustified in the 
inventory context. Certainly they would not expect to find 
anything that would fit into the legitimate inventory 
requirements. The officers could not articulate what items 
they would expect to find under the hood of an automobile in 
connection with their inventory. 
Finally, without knowing that the jewelry had been 
connected in a robbery in Salt Lake City, they seized the 
same and then conducted an investigation to determine 
whether it was stolen merchandise. 
The law seeks to prevent unreasonable searches. An 
inventory search is permissable if conducted with a 
legitimate goal. If the inventory search was a pretext the 
evidence seized should have been suppressed. 
-14-
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POINT II 
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONVICT 
APPELLANT OF AGGRAVATED ASSAULT BECAUSE NO 
EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED WHICH SHOWED THAT HE 
DIRECTLY COMMITTED THE OFFENSE OR AIDED OR 
ABETTED ANOTHER IN THE COMMISSSION OF THE 
OFFENSE 
In this case the state charged the specific crime of 
aggravated assault alleging that appellant either directly 
committed the offense or encouraged, aided, assisted, 
requested or commanded another to commit the crime. 
Although there may have been evidence concerning appellants 
participation in the robbery and theft, no evidence was 
presented that appellant participated in the aggravated 
assault of the named victim. 
The two people who were in a position to witness any 
aggravated assault, Stella Kyarsguard and JoAnn Knapus, 
identified others as the direct perpetuators of the 
offense. The state presented no evidence that appellant 
aided, encouraged, requested, or commanded that specific 
offense be committed. 
The states approach effectively blends the offense 
of aggravated robbery with aggravated assault. That is to 
say, if one commits an aggravated robbery or aids or assists 
-15-
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in the commission of that robbery then they necessarily have 
committed an aggravated assault. Rather than view each 
crime as a separate offense, this approach would almost make 
aggravated assault a lesser included offense of aggravated 
robbery. 
Title 76, Chapter 2, Section 202, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953 as Amended) defines the criminal 
responsibility of those who act directly to commit the 
offense or who aid another in conduct which constitutes an 
offense. The key element is the necessity that one must act 
with the mental state required for the commission of that 
particular offense. Those that do not directly, commit the 
offense but are still aiders need the requisite intent 
before they are criminally responsible. 
Aggravated assault, Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 
103, Utah Annotated Code, (1953 as amended), in the context 
of this case, required the actor to threaten another, which 
threat was accompanied by a show of immediate force or 
violence accomplished by the use of a deadly weapon. 
Aggravated robbery, Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 
302, Utah Code Annotated, (1953 as amended),on the other 
hand, is the unlawful and intentional taking of property, 
accomplished by means of force or fear with the use of a 
firearm. 
-16-
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In aggravated assault the intent is to do bodily 
injury or to threaten such injury with a show of force or 
violence. The intent in robbery is to take property in the 
possession of another using a firearm. One who aids in 
either of these offenses must do so with the intent that 
they engage in conduct that constitutes that particular 
offense. Part of each offense is the specific intent 
required. 
Consequently, because it was clear from the evidence 
that others committed directly the offense of aggravated 
assault on Stella Kyarsguard and as there was no evidence 
that appellant aided or abbetted that particular offense, 
the court erred in not granting a motion for directed 
verdict or in the alternative to dismiss the offense. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY REGARDING 
POSSESSION OF STOLEN PROPERTY BECAUSE THAT 
INSTRUCTION UNCONSTITUTIONALY SHIFTED THE BURDEN TO 
APPELLANT REGARDING AN ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE 
Instruction 19, given to the jury, instructed that: 
Under the law of the State of Utah, 
possession of property recently stolen, 
when a person in possession fails to 
make a satisfactory explanation of such 
possession, is a fact from which you may 
infer that the person in possession 
stole such property. 
-17-
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That instruction was deficient in two regards. The 
first/ as a legally correct statement of the lawf the jury 
was misdirected by the instruction. Secondly/ the 
instruction/ unconstitutionally/ shifted the burden of 
proof/ on an element of the offense charged/ from the state 
to appellant. 
That instruction was based in part on Title 76/ 
Chapter 6, Section 402, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as 
amended). That statute permits the presumption that 
property/ recently stolen/ in the possession of defendant 
would be deemed prima facie evidence that defendant stole 
the property. Instruction 19 failed to correctly state the 
presumption articulated in this statutory provision. 
The instruction used the word "fails" as oppose to 
the statutory language of "know". The significance being 
the difference between remaining silent/ as is implied by 
the statutory provision and offering some explanation which 
in the judgment of the finder of fact failed to be 
satisfactory. In other wordsf the statutory language 
contemplates, more strongly/ that no explanation is given as 
opposed to the instruction/ by using the word "fails"/ 
implying an unsatisfactory explanation. 
-18-
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The instruction used the word "infer" as opposed to 
the statutory language which indicated that there would be a 
"presumption" which would be deemed "prima facie". 
An inference, of course, is a process of reasoning 
by which a fact or proposition sought to be established is 
deduced as a logical consequence from other facts, or a 
state of facts, already proved or admitted. Prima facie 
evidence, on the other hand is evidence that, on its face, 
is good and sufficient, unless it is not rebutted or 
contradicted. (Refer: Blacks Law Dictionary) On the one 
hand an inference may be stronger, than prima facie because, 
to infer implies that the logical consequence of having 
established one fact inevitability leads to a conclusion 
which does not change even in the face of other facts to the 
contrary. That application has greater strength given the 
fact that the jury instruction in question instructed that 
"under the law of the state of Utah" the jury may make such 
an inference. 
In any event, the instruction was a misstatement of 
the statutory language from which it was drawn. 
More importantly, the instruction unconstitutionally 
shifted the burden to appellant in overcoming this legally 
sanctioned inference. 
-19-
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In In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1969) the Supreme 
Court, in an opinion written by Justice Brennan, applied the 
standard of proof of "beyond a reasonable doubt" to juvenile 
matters. The decision is a mini-thesis and conformation of 
the application of the reasonable doubt standard to criminal 
trials as the standard by which a defendant is to be found 
guilty, and the burden of such proof is on the government. 
The decision further confirmed the proposition that 
the government must present, "proof of every fact necessary 
to constitute the crime with which he is charged" supra, at 
Pg. 364. 
The application of those principles was applied to a 
jury instruction wherein the jury was instructed that the 
defendant is presumed to intend the ordinary consequences of 
his voluntary acts. 
In Sandstrom v Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979) the 
Supreme Court determined that the governments burden applied 
to proving each and all of the essential elements of the 
offense beyond a reasonable doubt and any instruction which 
shifted that burden violated the constitutional principles 
of due process of law. 
"the threshold question in ascertaining 
the constitutional analysis applicable 
to this kind of jury instruction is to 
-20-
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determine the nature of the presumptions 
it describes. That determination 
requires careful attention to the words 
actually spoken to the jury, before 
whether a defendant has been accorded 
his constitutional rights depends upon 
the way in which a reasonable juror 
could have interpreted the instruction." 
supra , at Pg. 514 
The Sandstrom decision prohibited making the 
presumptions which shifted the burden of proof to the 
defendant. However, in the recent decision of Francis v 
Franklin, 105 Supreme Court Reports 1965 (1985), the Supreme 
Court indicates that the use of the phrase "rebuttable" is 
not despositive of the main concern of shifting the burden 
of proof. 
"analysis must focus initially on the 
specific language challenged, but the 
inquiry does not end there. If a 
specific portion of the jury charge 
considered in isolation, could 
reasonably have been understood as 
creating a presumption that relieves the 
state of its burden of persuasion on an 
element of an offense, the potentially 
offending words must be considered in 
the context of the charge as a whole". 
supra, at Pg. 1971 
In the Franklin case there was the instruction 
involving intent, making it presumable that a person intends 
the natural and probable consequences of his acts. However, 
there was the caveat that the presumption is rebuttable. 
-21-
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The Supreme Court found that instruction unacceptable 
because the evidence offered in rebuttal would necessary 
have come from the defendant who has no burden to produce 
any such evidence. 
Although the instruction in this case did not use 
the term presumption and further employed the qualifying 
language of "may infer", it still did not overcome the 
constitutional defects because it "instructs the jury that 
it must infer the presumed fact if the state proves certain 
predicate facts" supra at page 1971. 
This'court considered these issues in State of Utah 
v James D. Chambers 20 Utah Adv. Rep. 14f filed: October 21, 
1985. 
This courts analysis was that the statute which gave 
rise to jury instructions of this type were 
unconstitutional: 
"because it directly relates to the issue 
of guilt and relieves the state of its 
burden of proof. The statue itself 
however is addressed to the court and 
merely provides a standard by which to 
determine whether the evidence presented 
warrants submission to the jury. Thus 
the statutory language should not be used 
in any form in instructing juries in 
criminal cases, and we expressly disavow 
the language and holdings of our earlier 
cases to the contrary", supra, at Pg. 18 
-22-
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Consequently because the language of instruction 19 shifts, at 
least to some degree, the burden of proof which must always rest with 
the state and because the instruction is a direct spin off of the 
statutory language contained in Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 402 (1) 
misstating the lawf appellant urges that his constitutional right to 
due process of law has been violated. 
POINT IV 
APPELLANT WAS IMPROPERLY CONVICTED OF BOTH 
THE OFFENSE OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY AND THE 
INCLUDED OFFENSE OF THEFT 
The case was submitted to the jury on both the 
offense of aggravated robbery and theft. Under the facts of 
this particular case theft is a lesser included of 
aggravated robbery. Title 76r Chapter 1, Section 402 (3), 
Utah Code Annotated, (1953 as amended) prohibits the 
conviction of both an offense charged and an included 
offense. 
In State of Utah v Hill, 674 P.2nd 96 (Utah 1983) 
this court examined this exact issue in relation to a charge 
of aggravated robbery and theft. In that case the defendant 
held a pistol on a apartment manager and threaten to kill 
him and a guest. The manager and guest were bound and the 
defendant subsequently took a tape recorder and other items 
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of electronic equipment together with cash from a desk. The 
defendant was charged with aggravated robbery and theft. 
This court concluded that under certain 
circumstances involving aggravated robbery, theft becomes a 
lesser include. Three circumstances were outlined by which 
aggravated robbery could be committed. These circumstances 
are outlined in Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 302, Utah Code 
Annotated, (1953 as amended). They are, an attempt to 
commit, during the commission of or in the immediate flight 
after the attempt or commission of a robbery. 
This court concluded, "in contrast the 
greater-lesser relationship does exists between theft and 
the second variation of aggravated robbery (use of a gun 
during the commission of a robbery)" Hill, at Pg. 97. 
Because the facts of this case are essentially the 
same as in Hill; that is, a firearm was used in the course 
of committing a robbery, and the perpetrators of the offense 
took property, appellant in essence has been convicted of 
both the greater offense and the lesser offense. 
Consequently, because such a result is prohibited by 
Title 76, Chapter 1, Section 402, (3), Utah Code Annotated, 
(1953 as amended), appellant is entitled to have the theft 
conviction reversed and the sentence vacated. 
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CONCLUSION 
Because the search of Appellant's automobile went 
beyond the scope of a true inventory search and was, in 
fact, an investigatory device engaged in by the police 
searching for incriminating evidence, the court should have 
suppressed the jewelry obtained therefrom and not permitted 
its introduction at trial. The search of the trunk the 
boxes and under the hood of the automobile went beyond 
constitutional limits and the evidence should have been 
suppressed. 
There was insufficient evidence to convict appellant ' 
of aggravated assault. Other persons were identified as 
directly committing that offense and there was no evidence 
that appellant aided those persons in its commission. 
Instruction 19, which permitted an inference to be 
drawn from the fact defendant was found in possession of 
recently stolen property was a violation of due process of 
law. Also, defendant was improperly convicted of both 
aggravated robbery and theft because the theft was a lesser 
included offense, under the circumstances of this case, of 
aggravated robbery. 
For these reasons, appellant is entitled to a new 
trial on the aggravated robbery, suppression of the evidence 
— O C 
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obtained from the automobile previously introduced at trial 
and reversal of his conviction for aggravated assault and 
theft. 
DATED this ^ > - * day of March, 1986. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED: 
wmi. ja&ei Apxorney for Appellant Metropolitan Law Building 
431 South 300 East, Suite 101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone:(801) 322-1616 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
DELIVERED four (4) copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellant to the Attorney General's Office/ 236 State 
Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 
day of March, 1986. 
-T fc 
'cT FRATTO, JR. 
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ADDENDUM 
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
76-2-202• Criminal responsibility for direct commission of 
offense or for conduct of another. - Every person, acting 
with the mental state required for the commission of an 
offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, 
requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids 
another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an 
offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such 
conduct. 
76-5-102. Assault. - (1) Assault is: 
(a) An attempt, with unlawful force or violence/ to do 
A 
bodily injury to another; or 
(b) A threat/ accompanied by a show of immediate force 
or violence to do bodily injury to another. 
i 
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76-5-103. Aggravated assault. - (1) A person commits 
aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in 
section 76-5-102 and: 
(a) He intentionally causes serious bodily injury to 
another; or 
(b) He uses a deadly weapon or such means or force 
likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
76-6-301. Robbery. - (1) Robbery is the unlawful and 
intentional taking of personal property in the possession of 
another from his person, or immediate presence, against his 
will, accomplished by means of force or fear. 
76-6-302. Aggravated robbery. - (1) A person commits 
aggravated robbery if in the course of committing robbery, 
her 
(a) Uses a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm, knife 
or a facsimile or a knife or a deadly weapon; or 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
76-1-402• Separate offenses arising out of single criminal 
episode — Included offenses. - (3) A defendant may be 
convicted of an offense included in the offense charged but 
may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the 
included offense. An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less 
than all the facts required to establish the commission of 
the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, 
conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit the offense 
charged or an offense otherwise included therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a 
lesser included offense. 
76-6-402. Presumptions and defenses. - The following 
presumption shall be applicable to this part: 
(1) Possession of property recently stolen, when no 
satisfactory explanation of such possession is made, shall 
be deemed prima facie evidence that the person in possesion 
stole the property. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 19 
Under the law of the State of Utah, possession of property 
recently stolen, when a person in possession fails to make a 
satisfactory explanation of such possession, is a fact from which 
you may infer that the person in possession stole such property. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Parole for the period of , pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
OHMDefendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County H'for delivery to the Utah State 
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